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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THB STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent,

••

-v-

••

RONALD DALE EASTHOPE,

Case No. 18310

••

Defendant-Appellant.

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Ronald Dale Easthope, appeals from a
conviction of aggravated sexual assault in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Appellant was charged with one count of aggravated
sexual assault, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann.,§ 76-5-405 (1978).

On February 8, 1982, appellant

was found guilty of the crime as charged by a jury.

On

February 23, 1982, Third District Judge Dean E. Conder
sentenced appellant to the statutory term of five years to
life in the Utah State Prison.

Judge Conder further

recommended that appellant serve thirty years on said sentence
prior to release or parole (R. 124).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the vernict and judgment
rerrlered in the lower court be affirmed.

STATP.MBNT OF FACTS
On September 22, 19Al, appellant was charged by
information with commission of the crime of aqqravated sexual
assault, a first-negree felony (R. 16).

The assault was

committed in the victim's apartment at 1010 Downington Avenue,
in the Sugarhouse area of Salt Lake City.

Appellant had been

convicten of two counts of rape and robbery in 1971

(T. 400)

and, aespite the absence of any evidence in the record on
appeal, it is conceded by respondent that appellant was known
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist" by some members of the legal and
law enforcement communities.
On October 6, 1981, following appellant's arrest,
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Ernie Jones filed a Motion
and Order for Production of Hair and Rody Fluid Samples (R.
7-8).

The state's Motion was heard hy Fifth Circuit Judge

Arthur G. Christean on October 8, 1981 (R. 6) and granted on
October 14, 1981 (R. 8).

Hair and blood samples were obtained

from appellant.
The preliminary hearinq was held on October 22, 1981
before Judge Christean; appellant was bound over for trial in
the district court at the conclusion of the hearing (R. 5).
The hearing took place with very little publicity (T. 3).
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On December 2, 1981, counsel for appellant filed
a Motion to Suppress the hair and blooa samples based upon his
contention that Judge Christean was without jurisdiction to
issue the Order compelling the samples (R. 22).

Appellant

filed an Amerrlen Motion to Suppress on December 4, 1981,
adding state and federal constitutional objections to the
samples (R. 27)1 the state filed a memorandum in opposition
thereto (R. 35-40).

Following argument on December 4, 1981

(R. 26), Third District Judge Peter F. Leary denied

appellant's Motion to Suppress (R. 41).
Appellant's four-day jury trial began on February 3,
1982, before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Third District

Judge.

Before the trial started, a meeting in chambers was

held to discuss appellant's Motion to Sequester the Jury (R.
42: T. 2-5).

No members of the press were present in the

courtroom at that time and Judge Conder denied the Motion with
leave to counsel for appellant to renew the Motion (T. 3).
Jury voir dire was begun with a panel of twenty
prospective jurors (R. 57).

Three members of the panel were

excused by the court, but it was shown that none of the panel
of twenty either knew the appellant (T. 11) or had heard of
the incident (T. 12).

During voir dire, the panel was

admonished not to •read, hear, listen to or see anything in
the news media regarding this case: whether or not it's by
television, newspaper or whatever means" (T. 25-26).
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the conclusion of the victim's (the state's first
witness) testimony during the first afternoon of trial,

~udge

Conder recessea the proceedings and convened a Meeting in
chambers between counsel and Dick Allgire,

~UTV,

Channel 2.

Judge Conder then entered an order prohibiting the media from
referring to appellant as the "Sugarhouse :Rapist" or to any of
appellant's "activities prior to the trial that would in any
way show his involvement with the law"

(~.

91-92).

Counsel

for KUTV unsuccessfully sought injunctive relief from this
Court from Judge Conder's Order (T. 121).
On the second morning of trial, appellant's counsel
renewe~

the µotion to Sequester and asked that the individual

jurors be polled.

Counsel based the renewal of the Motion

upon two news broadcasts from the preceding evening.

Judge

Conder denied both the Motion and the request, stating:
I heard the news report.
I don't think
that that was prejudicial • • • I think
that if we call them in and ask them about
it we only fan the flames even worse.
(T. 121).

nuring the course of the trial, Judge Conder
repeatedly admonished the jurors to refrain from anv contact
with the news media('!'. 35, 117, ,.66, 321, 304).

No

violations of the judge's Orner or any instances of
inadv~rtent

exposure of jurors to publicity were alleged.
-4-
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•

On the final day of trial, appellant took the stand
and acknowledged the prior rape and robbery and convictions
an3 his extensive incarceration (T. 400-402, 418-419).

The

jury deliberated for less then two hours (T. 490, 491) and
returned a verdict of guilty as charged (T. 491).
ARGUMRNT
POI~lT

THE CIRCUIT CC"HlRT JTJT)r,F.
APPELT.. ANT 'r'O PERMIT THF
AND HAIR. SAMPLF.S.

Utah Code

Ann.,~

I

PP.()PP.PLY RF.QUIRP.D
TARIN~

OF BLOOD

77-35-16(h) (Supp. 19Al)* states,

in pertinent part:
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations,
the accused mav be required to:
•

•

•

•

(6) Permit the taking of samples of bloon,
hair, fingernail scrapings, and other
bodily materials which can be obtained
without unreasonable intrusion~
•

•

•

•

Pursuant

to~

77-35-16(h), Deputy Salt Lake County

Attorney Ernie Jones filed a "Motion and Order for Production
of Hair and Body Fluin Samples" and an accompanying "Notice of
Rearing"

(~.

7-9).

on October 14, 19A2, Fifth Circuit Court

*All statutory references herein are to Utah Code
Annotated.
-5-
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Judge Arthur

~.

Christean granted the Motion and ordered

appellant to "surrenoer hair, hody ano pubic hair samples
together with saliva and bloon fluins • • • "

(R.

A).

Appellant contenns that ,ludge r.hristean 's nrder exceeds the
jurisdiction vested in a magistrate handling a felony case.
-~.

A MA(;! S 'T"R ATE IN tr:::' AH HAS S':'ATUTORY

Atl':T"nnRITY ':"n O:RDP.:R THB TA T<I N~

()~

HAIR

AND BLOOD SAMPLRS.

van nam v. Morris, ut ah , 5 71 P. 2d 13 25 ( 19; 7) ,
establishes the principle that:
The authority of a magistrate
statutory. A judge, who sits
magistrate does not carry his
judicial attributes with him,
the extent they inhere in the
JTlagistrate.
Id. at 1327.

~he

is purely
as a
court or his
except to
office of

statutory authority for Judge Christean's

Orner in the instant case

is~

'7-35-16(h) (Rupp. 1981).

The

authority given therein is not, contrary to appellant's
position, limited to the exercise by a "court": the authority
rnay be invoked at all stages of the criminal process.
of the absence of any limiting language in

R.ecause

s 77-15-lh(h)

(e.g., the specific references to "the court"

in~

77-35-16(f),(g)), it must be assumed that the legislative
intent was to confer the powers of

~

77-35-l~(h)

upon both

magistrate and trial judge alike.
-6-
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In Rolman v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 174
Cal. Rptr. 506, 629 P.2d 14 (1981), the California Supreme
Court was presented with a case similar to the.one at bar.
Defendants in a narcotics case sought discovery of names of
witnesses, reports and physical evidence prior to the
preliminary hearing.

The prosecutor resisted the efforts at

discovery by asserting that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction
to issue discovery orders because only "courts" may order
pretrial discovery.

In finding that limited discovery should

be available prior to the preliminary hearing, the unanimous
court stated:
As we indicated above, it is the
general rule that in the absence of
contrary legislation courts have the
inherent power to order appropriate
pretrial discovery. We believe a similar
inherent power exists, and may be
exercised, by magistrates ancillary to
their statutory power to determine whether
there is probable cause to hold the
defendant to answer. The magistrate's
statutory role is directed toward making a
preliminary assessment of the truth or
falsity of the charges filed against the
defendant1 pretrial discovery may well
assist in such a determination (citation
omitted).
629 P.2d at 17.

S 77-35-16(h) (Supp. 1981) provides the

statutory authority that was missing in Holman, thereby
supplementing the inherent power of a magistrate with an
express legislative prerogative.
-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant cites van narn v. Morris in support of his
argument that a magistrate lacks jurisdiction to issue orners
compelling the surrender of hair and hlooa samples.

van nam

must be limited to its holding, i.e., that a magistrate
conducting a preliminary henring may only discharge the
defendant "without prejudice" or bind him over for trial in
the district court.

.1\

magistrate cannot exceed the

jurisdiction over a case granted to him by statute.

~he

issue

in the instant case is not one of jurisdiction; the
magistrate's order compelling hair and bloon samples in no way
divests the district court of the ultimate jurisdiction over
the felony case.
Appellant makes much of the Memorandum Decision of
Third nistrict Judge Dean
No.

M- 80- 8 8

~ecause

~.

Conder in Cannon v.

( ~h ird Dist. Ct. , necembe r 1 C),

1~80)

~eller,

Misc.

{'P. 2 4) •

lJunge Conder' s decision is on appeal to this court as

Cannon v.

~eller

and nssana, No. 18441 (Utah Sup. Ct., filen

May 6, 1982), the case is deserving of brief discussion here.
In Cannon v.

~eller,

the defendant in a narcotics case sought

the identity of a confidential informant by filing a discovery
motion

under~

77-35-16 (Rrief of Appellant ossana at 2).

Fifth Circuit Junqe Larry
motion.

~.

Keller granted the defendant's

TJpon petition by the prosecution, ,lunge Conder then

issuen a writ of mandamus that is the basis of the appeal to
this court (Id. at 2-4).
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Judge Conder's ruling was based upon his finding
that:
Therefore, if the defendant has any right
to discovery before a committing
magistrate it must be established by the
Constitution or statute. Our Constitution
is silent on the matter (except for •due
process" question) and the statute is
ambiguous to say the least.
(R. 2~).
~

In fact, there is no express statutory authority in

77-35-16 (Supp. lQRl) for a magistrate to order the

prosecution to disclose the name of a confidential informant
prior to the preliminary hearing.

s

7~-35-ln{a){5)

(Supp.

1981) provides only discretionary authority at best:
(a) Except as otherwise provide~, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or
information of which he has knowledge:
•

•

• •

(5) Any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the defendant
in order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense.
The crucial distinction between Cannon v. Keller and
the instant case is the difference between colorable,
discretionary authority and express power.

A magistrate in

Utah has express authority to compel the taking of hair and
blood samples.
-9-
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B.

PRACTICAL C.ONSIDF.RATinNS :R.EQUI:RPi THE
TAKIN(; OF HAIR ANJ) RT"'non RAMP1.RS AT
THE FARLI~ST POS~IRLE TIMP..

Appellant statP.s, at page five of

hi~

Rrief, that:

The fair import of the language of nule 16
evidence [sic] a legislative intent that
the discovery process be under the
direction of "the court" having
jurisdiction to try the case, and not the
magistrate who merely conducts the
probable cause hearing.
If appellant's arguMent were to he followed,

it would be

necessary for a district judge to specifically authorize everv
post-arrest procedure.
to authorize, for

The district junge would be required

exa~ple:

1. the appearance of the accused at a
line-up;

~ome

2.

the fingerprinting of the accused; or

3.

the taking of hair and blood samples.

of these procedures (e.g., 1 ine-up, fingerprinting) could

precede the filing of an information in many cases.

~he

district judge would be required, without the benefit of a
file or a single pleading, to supervise each step in the
progression of the case from arrest through sentencing.

~he

implications of such a cumbersome process are obvious.
Other practical considerations are the statutorv ann
constitutional time constraints to which a prosecutor must
adhere.

~he

State simply must have an expeditious procedure

-ln-
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whereby physical eviaence can be obtained and (1) processed
quickly for presentation at the preliminary hearing, if
necessary, or (2) submitted for expert forensic analysis
promptly enough to ensure a timely return for introduction at
trial.

If a prosecutor were required to present a motion to a

district judge and obtain an oraer prior to securing the
evidence, the entire- sequential chronology could break down.
In summary, the language of

~

77-35-16(h) is

adequate authority for a magistrate to order the taking of
hair and blood samples.

§

~7-35-l(b\

'Supp. 1981) provides:

These rules shall govern the procedure in
all criminal cases in the courts of this
state except juvenile court cases. These
rules are intended and shall be construed
to secure simplicity in procedure,
fairness in administration, and the
elimination of unnecessary expense and
delay (emphasis added).
Appellant has failed to demonstrate any legal precedent or
inherent prejudice that woulo deny the magistrate the
authority to issue the Order in this case.

In light of the

statutory authority and the clear expression of legislative
intent found

in~

77-35-l(b), the Order at issue must be

permitted to stand.
POINT II
THE P,XTRACTION OF BLonn FROM APPPiLLANT nrn
NOT REQUIRB A SEARCH WARRANT.
-11-
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~he

intrusion

extraction of blood from appellant was a minor

con~ucted

unoer carefully controlled conditions.

The procedure followen notice to anoellant, an adversarial
hearing on the question and a review by a neutral and
magistrate.

! f this court should finn

detache~

that the magistrate

lacked authority to issue the subject Order, then it should
find that no search warrant was required unner the
circumstances.
Appellant has recited enough of the facts of the
controlling case, Schrnerber v. California,
(1966), to establish a basis for analysis.
sentence of Justice

~rennan's

3A4 rJ.S.

75;

The concluning

opinion in Schmerber is the key

language:
we today hold that the Constitution
does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's ho~y under
Rtringently limited conditions in no wav
indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other
conditions.
~hat

Id. at

112.

Therefore, if the procenure in the instant case

is to be permissible, the intrusion must be minor and
conducted under "stringently limited conditions."
The degree of intrusion in this case was like that
in Schmerber--an extraction of blood by a competent medical
technician (T.

~04-nS,

322).

~he

conditions of the extraction

were also stringently limited in that:

(1) an information ann

warrant of arrest had been filed and issued, (2) the appellant
-12-
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•...

had been arrested and was in jail, (3) the state had filed a
motion and gave notice to appellant and his attorney, (4) an
adversarial hearing was held, and (5) the order was issued by
a neutral and detached magistrate (who, notably, limited the
scope of the intrusion sought by denying the state's request
for a sperm sample (R. 8)).

Appellant was afforded greater

protection (e.g., notice, hearing) than if a search warrant
had been sought.

As is stated in Rchmerber,

The requirement that a warrant be obtained
is a requirement that the inferences to
support the search "be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime" (citations omitted).
384

u.s.

at 770.

The inferences in the instant case were

drawn by a neutral and detached Magistrate, thereby avoiding
the consequences of a constitutionally infirm search.
The legislature has reflected the judgment that
the extraction of blood under circumstances does not
constitute an "unreasonable intrusion."
also:

~

77-3~-16(h).

State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P. 2d 353 ( 1980).

See

There

being no specific constitutional prohibition to the procedure
followed in the instant case, the obtaining of appellant's
blood sample must be permitted to stand.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SRQUESTF.R

THE ~URY.
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On January

~2,

1983, counsP.l for appellant filed a

Motion to Sequester the ,lury and Notice of Hearing

(R.

42).

On the first morning of trial, the trial judge denied
appellant's Motion (R. 4R:
renew the Motion (T. 1).

~.

3), but granted counsel leave to

r.ounsel for appellant renewed the

Motion the following morning

12n), and again,

('r'.

in the forr"l

of a Motion for Mistrial, at the conclusion of the state's
case

(~.

369).

Both Motions were nenied by the trial court.

Appellant alleges error in the failure to sequester the jury.
A.

SF.QTJF,S':"PA~ION

JURY

OF THE

OF OISCRETION FO:R

TH~

IS A MATTER

~RIAL

i_lUDGB.

Section 77-17-9'1) (Supp. 1981) states:
The court, at any time before the
submission of the case to the jury, may
permit the jury to separate or order that
it be sequestered in charge of a proper
officer.
The language of the statute is permissive ann leaves to the
judgment of the trial junge the continuing power to sequester.
The trial judge properly ref used to sequester the jury in this
case.
Each case must be assessed on its own facts and
circumstances.

~ee,

e.q., State v. Pierre, Utah, 572

133A (1977): 72 ALR 3d 100, 131.

~.2d

tn the instant case, Judge

Conder initially determined that sequestration of the jury was
not called for ann also guarded against the need arising
during the course of the trial:
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(1) It was confirmed that the preliminary
hearing was conducted without "much
publicity" (T. 3);
(2) Sufficient voir dire was conducted to
show that:
(a) none of the panel of twenty
prospective jurors knew the defendant (T.
11),
(b) none of the panel had heard of the
incident (T. 12), ana
(c) all members of the panel would
adhere to the judge's admonitions on media
exposure (T. 25-26);
(3) The judge repeatedly admonished the
jurors concerning publicity (T. 35, 117,
266, 323, 384);

(4) The judge directed the prosecutor to
refer to the site of the crime as "1010
nownington Avenue" (T. 4)--specifically to
avoid any reference to "Sugarhouse"; and
(5) The trial court ordered the press to
refrain from using the term "Sugarhouse
Rapist" and from commenting "about Mr.
Easthope's activities prior to the trial
that would in any way show his involvement
with the law (T. 91-9~).
The language that most clearly reflects the
meticulous care taken by Judge Conder to avoid any prejudice
to the defendant is:
I'm concerned about any publicity on it.
I'll keep a close eye on it and admonish
the jurors again to avoid any news
broadcasts on it. I think that if we call
them in and ask them about it we only fan
the flames even worse (T. 121).
-15-
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B.

APPELT...ANT HAS
BURD~N

FAITJ~n

'T'()

<"'F DP,MONS'!'RATINC";

LIT<RL IHf)QD OF OR.

A~TJAL

MBF.T HIS
A ~fJRS't'ANTIAL
P~ElTTTT1IC~.

tn State v. Andrews, Utah, 576 P.2d 859 (1978), this
court stated:
It is the general rule that one who wishes
to challenge a judge's allowance of juror
separation must demonstrate either actual
prejudiceor a -substantial likelihood that
some prejudice did result from the refusal
to sequester (citations omitted).
Id. at 859.

Appellant can only employ speculative language to

suggest the possibility of prejudice and he fails entirely to
deMonstrate any adverse effect of his conjecture.

Absent such

a showing by appellant, this court should adhere to the
general rule ann permit the decisions of the trial judge to
stand.

POINT I'V
TRP. TPIAL COU'RT PROPERLY OEN!BD
APPF,LLANT' s MOTION TO POLL TH~ ~TTJR~ flTJ~I~C";
TRIAL.

Appellant asserts that the trial judge's failure to
poll the jurors on the second morning of the trial constitutes
reversible error

(~.

1/.0-21).

Appellant has failed to

estahlish any degree of prejudice that would require the trial
judge to investigate by polling the jurors.
-11;-
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A.

'rHE NBWS ACCOUNTS OF APPELLANT'S TRIAL
WERE NOT PRF\TTJOICIAL.

The trial judge in the instant case heard the news
reports that appellant claims were prejudicial (T. 121).

He

determined that the reports were not prejudicial and appellant
has failed in this appeal to demonstrate otherwise.

Appellant

has failed to establish an adequate appellate record for his
basic premise, i.e.7 that appellant's reputation as the
"Sugarhouse Rapist" was so widely known that the jurors "may
easily have caught" a subsequent speculative "connection
(Brief of Appellant at 17).

Moreover, appellant states, "And

at the appellant's arrest and preliminary hearing, the media
emphatically told the public that the 'Sugarhouse Rapist' was
again being tried for rape" (Id. at 17).

This assertion is

inconsistent with the following colloquy on the first morning
of trial:
THE COURT: was there much publicity in
connection with the preliminary hearing?
MR. BROWN:

No, there wasn't.

THE COURT:

I didn't see any.

MR. BROWN: NO television coverage at all
at the preliminary hearing, and I never
sought any news coverage (T. 3).

There is simply no evidence in the record concerning any
electronic or print media coverage that was prejudicial to
appellant.

-17-
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~ppellant's

542 F.2d ·106 (4th
hand.

~ir.

own citation of united States v. l.lones,
197~),

is dispositive of the issue at

In llones, the asserted prejudicial publicity during

trial included several newspaper articles which were "accurate
condensed statement[sJ of testimony actually aamittea into
evidence and heard by the jury", news accounts of threats to
the judge and prosecution and a tangentially related news
story "obliquely" imolicating the defendant in drug
trafficking.

54~

F.2d at 196-97.

~he

Jones court, relying

upon its earlier holding in United States v. Hankish, c;o2 F.2d
71 (4th Cir. 1974), stated:
' [W]e do not hold that every newspaper
article appearing during trial requires
such protective measures.
Unless there is
substantial reason to fear preJudice, the
trial judge may decline to question the
jurors.'
It follows then that whenever a
claim of in-trial prejudicial publicity
arises, the threshold question, or, as the
Court in nnited States v. Pomponio, supra,
put it, the •initial determination' for
the trial court is whether the publicity
rises to the level of substantial
prejudicial material.
If it does not rise
to such a level, the trial court is under
no duty to interrogate the jury or to take
the steps marrlated by Hankish. And
whether it does rise to the level of
substantial prejudice requiring that
procedure is ordinarily a question
'committed to the trial court's
discretion' and 'the scope of this
judicial discretion includes the
responsibility of determining the extent
am type of investigation requisite to a
ruling on the motion' (emphasis original).

-18-
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54~

F.2d at 194.

The Fourth Circuit went on to find that the

publicity was not prejudicial.
Appellant fails to establish the predicate of his
own argument:
If the trial court fails to make at least
an initial inquiry (where media reports
are prejudicial), the accused is thereby
oenied the opportunity to find out whether
or not the jurors have been exposed to the
reports • • • (emphasis added).
(Rrief of Appellant at 14).

The limited news reports in the

present case were not prejudicial and did not trigger a duty
of inquiry on the part of the trial judge.
B.

ASSUMinr,, ARGUEN!Y>, THAT THE LIMITED
PUBLICITY WAS PREJUDICIAL, THE 3URY
WAS EXPOS ED TO AI,L SUCH INFORMATION
THR.OUGH THE APPELLANT'S OWN TESTIMONY
AT TRIAL.

All of appellant's protestations concerning
publicity of his prior rape convictions became academic at the
point during the trial when appellant took the stana ana
testified about the prior rapes, convictions and incarceration
(T. 400-402, 418-19).

As is statea in Jones, supra,

With hardly an exception, the cases in
which substantial prejudicial publicity
during trial was found, the publicity
involved information about the defendant
that would not be admissible before the
jury or that was not in fact put before
the jury in court (citations omitted).
-19-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

54~

F.2d at 195.

The evidence in the case at bar was put

before the jury very clearly by appellant himself.

Appellant

cannot now claim error.
r.nNCLTJ~I()N

Appellant's argument with respect to a magistrate's
authority to issue orders compelling
blood samples ignores the language

th~

of~

taking of hair and
7'-3,-lh{h)(6) and is

an attempt to stress form over substance.

The argument would

be more compelling if appellant could demonstrate some

prejudic€ to his rights resulting from the procedure
authorized by statute.

Re cannot.

Rection

77-3~-16(h)(6)

is

specific, reasonable authority for the issuance of the nrder
in this case.
If this court should find that Junge Christean had
no authority to issue the subject Order, respondent's position
requires strict Fourth AMerrlment analysis in that the blood
sample was obtained without a search warrant and the taking
does not fit within any of the classicly defined exceptions to
the warrant requirement.

However, close scrutiny of Schmerher

v. California reveals that the obtaining of the blood sample
in the case at bar was constitutionally permissible hecause it
followed a review by a neutral and detached magistrate, it was
a minor intrusion and it was conducted under stringently
limiten conditions.

The safeguarns of the Fourth Amendment

were honoren and the obtaining of the blood sample should be
val ida tea.
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Appellant's contentions concerning prejudicial
publicity and possible jury bias have illusory appeal because
of appellant's past notoriety.

However, the past notoriety

had, perhaps surprisingly, apparently faded during his tenyear incarceration.

Publicity at the arrest and preliminary

hearing stages was minimal.

When counsel for appellant raised

the issue of possible prejudice to the trial judge, immediate,
comprehensive preventive measures were instituted.
Sequestration of the jury is a matter within the discretion of
the trial judge and respondent submits that Judge Conder
properly exercised his discretion in this case.
The verdict and judgment in the lower court should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of February,
1983.

CURTIS J.
Assistant

(",eneral

CF.RTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to

~ynn R.

Brown and J. Mark Andrus, Attorneys for Appellant, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Assoc., 333 South 200 P,ast, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84111, this 15th day of February, 1983.
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